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Данная публикация является кратким представлением книги Татьяны Горнштейн «Философия 
Николая Гартмана» (1969) для читателей, не владеющих русским языком. В этой презентации 
говорится несколько слов об авторе работы, описываются цель и структура книги, раскрыва-
ется основное содержание ее глав. Также здесь сделан акцент на наиболее интересные моменты 
анализа философии Гартмана, проделанного автором книги. Порядок представления содержа-
ния книги соответствует порядку глав в данной монографии. Особое внимание уделено оценке 
и критике гартмановской онтологии с позиций диалектического материализма, которые прово-
дятся Горнштейн на протяжении всей ее книги.
Ключевые слова: Онтология, метафизика, моменты бытия, способы бытия, модальности, фило-
софия природы, Николай Гартман, Татьяна Горнштейн.
I would like to give to my foreign colleagues a brief presentation of Tatyana 
Gornshtein’s Nicolai Hartmann’s Philosophy, a book, which was written in Russian and 
published back in 1969. The full title of a work is Nicolai Hartmann’s Philosophy. (A 
Critical Analysis of the Fundamental Problems of Ontology) (Gornshtein, 1969). It was 
published by The Science Publishing House (Leningrad Branch) as a paperback and 
numbered 279 pages.
As far as the author of the book, Tatyana Nikolaevna Gornshtein (Russian: 
Татьяна Николаевна Горнштейн) (01.29.1904 — 09.23.1980) is concerned, she was 
an expert on history and philosophy of science and a very prominent figure in the in-
tellectual life of the USSR, which is evidenced by the fact that she was the first woman 
to become a doctor of science (DSc analogue in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia) in 
philosophy in the Soviet Union1, as well as by the fact that it was with her that Ludwig 
Wittgenstein met in person through the recommendation given by her Moscow col-
league, Sofya Yanovskaya, during his visit to Leningrad in 19352.
Gornshtein’s book includes an introduction, six chapters, a conclusion, a list of 
Hartmann’s works and a list of abbreviations. 
The introduction is devoted to Nicolai Hartmann’s biography, the date of his 
birth being somehow mistakenly stated as July 20 (instead of February 20), 1882. It 
also gives an account on gradual changes in his views. The introduction also includes 
Gornshtein’s outline of the reception which Hartmann’s philosophy received, noting, 
1 According to E. G. Drukarev: (Drukarev & Zakhar’yashchev, 2012).
2 Tatyana Gornshtein’s daughter, Lyudmila Gornshtein, has published in Russian an account of her 
mother’s meeting with Wittgenstein based on Tatyana Gornshtein’s recollections. One of the most 
striking episodes is associated with Wittgenstein sending Tatyana Gornshtein one of his notebooks, 
the so-called, ‘the yellow notebook’. Later Gornshtein lost it, when she hid it (being afraid of police 
search) in the Archive of Medical Papers of the city of Vladimir, where she lived and worked at that 
time. Unfortunately, the memories of Lyudmila Gornshtein are currently available in Russian only 
(Gornshtein, 2001).
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however, that his philosophy had a more pronounced influence on the so-called ‘con-
tinental’ (especially on German, French and Italian) thinkers and it remained relevant 
not only for philosophers, but also for natural scientists as well. At the same time, 
regarding English-speaking philosophy, she states that, “Hartmann is little-known in 
Anglo-Saxon countries” (Gornshtein, 1969, 4). She explains this situation by the fact 
that, “due to domination of ‘the logical analysis’ in England, the continental ontolo-
gy and metaphysics are generally (not only in Hartmann’s vision) ignored as artifi-
cial unscientific constructions” (Gornshtein, 1969, 4). Nevertheless, she also makes 
a brief reconstruction of Hartmann’s attitude toward philosophy dominant in the 
English-speaking world, although without referring to any specific passages in his 
works, “Hartmann and other metaphysicians, in their turn, consider British empir-
icism ‘philistine’, ‘destroying the soul’ ” (Gornshtein, 1969, 4). Besides, in the spirit 
of the Soviet philosophy, Gornshtein criticizes Hartmann for his alleged political in-
difference. In fact, according to her, “the mask of non-partisanship and objectivism 
conceals the reactionary political views of this ‘philosopher and hermit’” (Gornshtein, 
1969, 5). At first sight it might seem that Gornshtein was forced to accuse Hartmann 
of political reactionism, attributing ‘bourgeois-class nature’ to his philosophy, simply 
because during the Soviet era any author who wanted his work devoted to a philoso-
pher outside dialectical and historical materialism to be published had to criticize this 
philosopher’s thought from the standpoint of these doctrines, and that starting from 
the very first pages of such work and spicing it with abundant quotations from Marx, 
Engels and Lenin. However, upon a closer look at Gornshtein’s work it becomes clear 
that she often gives an extensive critique of Hartmann’s philosophy from the stand-
point of dialectical materialism throughout the entire book. Moreover, the critical 
conclusions Gornshtein comes to are very logical and seem to be implied by the basic 
principles of this doctrine. This might incline one to think that this critique was not 
only accounted for by reasons of pure ideology — rather, it was rooted in Gornshtein’s 
own intellectual standpoint. Therefore, Gornshtein’s critique can be of some theoret-
ical importance, valid for understanding Hartmann’s legacy, and therefore instead of 
being ignored, it should be extensively reconstructed.
Gornshtein focuses her work on giving “perhaps, the most complete idea” of 
Hartmann’s philosophy, since the works published abroad addressed only some par-
ticular aspects of his thought, but none of the works gave a general overview thereof 
by the time Gornshtein’s book was written. However, she specifies that, given the au-
thor’s specialization in philosophy, “there is no special consideration of the problems 
of philosophy of spirit, ethics, aesthetics, as well as of the philosophical problems of 
biology given in the book” (Gornshtein, 1969, 8).
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The first chapter of the book is titled Ontology and Metaphysics. Herein, Gorn-
shtein presents quite reasonable grounds for Hartmann’s distinction between these 
two philosophical disciplines, as well as reasons for the shift towards ontology which 
occurred in this philosopher’s thought. And yet, she advances that ontology is com-
pletely unnecessary from the perspective of dialectical materialism. The same chapter 
also comprises an analysis of Hartmann’s doctrine of the distinction and correlation 
of ontological factors, explaining the difference between Hartmann’s interpretation of 
this matter and the traditional doctrines of distinction and correlation of essentia and 
existentia. Gornshtein focuses on the significance which the aporetic way of thinking 
had for Hartmann, including its potential for understanding ontological and meta-
physical problems. In this regard she also gives a historical overview of Hartmann’s 
predecessors in philosophical aporetic, which brings her to analyzing methodological 
problems of ontology, in their broader sense, as well as methodological problems of 
Hartmann’s research in the history of philosophy.
The second chapter, titled The Doctrine of Spheres of Being, perhaps, belongs to 
the most informative parts of the book. Gornshtein states that
Hartmann distinguishes four spheres in that totality which is implied by the concept of 
being, i.e. two primary spheres, independent of human consciousness (‘being-in-itself ’) 
and two secondary spheres, derivatives (‘being-for-us’). The primary spheres have two 
main modes of being (Seinsweise), i.e. real and ideal being. (Gornshtein, 1969, 35)
Two basic modes of being inherent in the primary spheres are “real and ideal 
being” (Gornshtein, 1969, 35). Gornshtein expands upon the specific content of the 
concepts of the real and ideal in Hartmann’s works, analyzes the distinction between 
four layers of the real, noting that, according to this thinker, belonging to the time is 
common to all the real. She considered it to be the reason why Hartmann unjustifiably 
reckons mental processes and historical events among the real. She believes that the 
main mistake the philosopher makes resides in treating matter as substance, thus, re-
ducing it to the lower layer of the real, which leads him to being unable to understand 
that in a broader sense, it is materiality that is the basis of the world’s unity. In par-
ticular, both psyche and history should be considered as the highest manifestations 
of the matter, originally capable of self-moving and self-developing (in Gornshtein’s 
view). At the same time, regarding the specifics of the ideal being Gornshtein states 
that, “The main distinction between the ideal world and the real one is timelessness, 
unchangeability” (Gornshtein, 1969, 51). It gives her a ground for a rather harsh cri-
tique of Hartmann’s recognition of the independence of the ideal being, to which the 
philosopher attributes mathematical objectivity and values. Even though she speaks 
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favorably of Hartmann’s critique of the subjectivism of positivists and neo-Kantians. 
The author also states that “Hartmann’s doctrine of ‘layers’ acquired a great influence 
in foreign philosophy” (Gornshtein, 1969, 44), while emphasizing the distinction be-
tween ‘layering’ and ‘gradualness’ in its concept. In any event, she opposes Hartmann’s 
doctrine qua dualism to dialectical materialism as a monistic doctrine, being support-
ive of the latter.
The third chapter of the book is titled The Problem of Cognition. Here Gorn-
shtein notes that Hartmann’s doctrine of cognition had been undergoing some impor-
tant changes in the course of his personal philosophical evolution. She even believes 
that it is possible to distinguish four evolutional stages this philosopher’s doctrine of 
cognition went through, namely the first one, starting in 1909, the second one, start-
ing in 1921, the third one, starting in 1933, and, finally, the fourth one, characteristic 
of him, which lasted from 1940 to 1950. She gives a thorough consideration to the 
meaning Hartmann assigns to metaphysics of cognition, noting that it does not ap-
ply to metaphysics which is built on the basis of the phenomenon of cognition, but 
gives “a new name to the theory of cognition, which is based not on psychology and 
logic, but on new critical metaphysics” (Gornshtein, 1969, 75). Gornshtein describes 
the starting point of metaphysics of cognition posed by German philosopher as the 
‘agnostic’ one. The analysis and estimation of “the law of transcendence of acts of cog-
nition” undertaken by the author of the book come under notice within this chapter. 
Gornshtein insists that Hartmann suggests a fundamentally new understanding both 
of transcendental and cognitive attitudes. Hartmann considers the traditional cogni-
tive-theoretic attitude as artificial; however, for him “it is the unity of the cognizing 
subject and the object in the single real world which is ontologically primary but not 
the opposition of the subject to the object” (Gornshtein, 1969, 82). It is interesting 
that within this context Gornshtein compares Hartmann’s doctrine of cognition both 
with Marxist doctrine of cognition and with M. Heidegger’s ontological position and 
his critique of Hartmann, posed in Being and Time (Heidegger, 2001, 208). Other 
sections of the third chapter of the book are devoted to the analysis of emotional and 
transcendent acts, a posteriori cognition, the problem of a priori cognition of the real 
entity, as well as to problems of cognition of the ideal world.
The fourth chapter, the most voluminous in the entire book, is entitled The Gen-
eral Doctrine of Categories. Here Gornshtein says that, starting form 1940, Hartmann 
begins to conceive ontology as a doctrine of categories. According to her, the analysis 
of categories, undertaken by the philosopher is much more specific for him than just 
the formal analysis of the ‘factors’ and ‘modes’ of being, which he undertook before. 
She also highlights the well-known duality in Hartmann’s understanding of the cat-
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egories, saying that he “always refers both to principles of being and principles of 
cognition as categories…” (Gornshtein, 1969, 112). Hartmann considers ontological 
categories as “the framework of being, its structure” (Gornshtein, 1969, 117). Accord-
ing to Gornshtein, such interpretation of categories initially implies the conviction 
that the world isn’t chaos and it has a stable structure. Hartmann doesn’t consider 
categories to be some ideal entity, for him they have substrate moments. However, 
“ideal being, as well as the real one, comprises its own ideal categories, its own ideal 
principles” (Gornshtein, 1969, 121). Still, categories remain neutral in relation to the 
opposition of idealism / realism. However, proceeding from standpoints of dialectical 
materialism, Gornshtein identifies Hartmann’s doctrine of categories as the doctrine 
“of objective idealistic nature, similar to the one of the doctrine of ideal being” (Gorn-
shtein, 1969, 125). Further on, this chapter comprises the analysis of the so-called 
‘fundamental categories’, lists the groups such categories are applicable to, presents 
and interprets Hartmann’s table of ‘elementary opposites of being’. Gornshtein exam-
ines such concepts of Hartmann’s philosophy as the structure, the modus, the essence, 
the attitude, the determination and the dependence. She gives much attention to the 
analysis of categorical laws established by Hartmann, as well as to the methodological 
issues of categorical cognition.
The fifth chapter of the book is titled The Problem of Possibility and Actuality 
(The Modal Analysis of Being). This chapter, perhaps, is the most concise in the entire 
book. Herein, Gornshtein declare that, “Hartmann seeks to reinforce his idealistic on-
tology with the analysis of ‘modalities of being’, id est the actuality, the possibility, the 
necessity and the contingency” (Gornshtein, 1969, 184). She notes that, according to 
Hartmann, all previous experiments of ontology of modalities were contradictory due 
to the insufficient differentiation of the ideal and real ways of being. Hereafter, her 
analysis of Hartmann’s doctrine of modalities addresses the modalities of real being 
and ideal being. The most interesting here is the analysis of differences between real 
and ideal possibilities, as well as that of differences in the correlation of the possibility 
and the actuality in real and ideal being. Eventually, Gornshtein gives an ambivalent 
account of Hartmann’s theory of modalities. On the one hand, according to her, it 
is ‘flawed’, particularly with regard to the doctrine of the possibility and the actuali-
ty, which is caused by the ‘objective idealistic’ and ‘generally metaphysical’ nature of 
Hartmann’s philosophy. On the other hand, she speaks highly of Hartmann applying 
‘the historical approach’ to the doctrine of modalities, “substantiated by an extraordi-
nary erudition in the field of the history of philosophy” (Gornshtein, 1969, 202).
Finally, there is the last, sixth chapter, titled The Certain Problems of Philosophy 
of Nature. Gornshtein starts it by noting that there is an opposition between philos-
334 ANDREI PATKUL
ophy of science, in particular, natural science and philosophy of nature in modern 
philosophy. She believes that it is more common to Soviet philosophical literature to 
appeal to philosophy of science, which in turn is understood as “the positivistic meth-
odology of natural science”, but Nicolai Hartmann’s natural philosophy was never 
analyzed by Soviet philosophers. Hereafter, she reconstructs four periods of history 
of natural philosophy, distinguished by Hartmann, noting that, according to him, 
“there has been nothing that could be considered as a genuine philosophy of nature 
for the last hundred years (1850–1950)…” (Gornshtein, 1969, 205). The description 
of the correlation between natural philosophy and metaphysics posed by Hartmann, 
as well as that between natural philosophy and natural science, given by Gornshtein 
is also of some interest. She reconstructs three classes of categories of natural being 
posed by Hartmann, namely (1) dimensional categories, (2) cosmological categories, 
(3) organological categories. Analyzing dimensional categories, Gornshtein focuses 
on the distinction between concepts of the ideal and real spaces as well as of the 
so-called perceptual space given by Hartmann. It is precisely the interpretation of 
the latter which makes her state that, “Hartmann was strongly influenced by Kant’s 
apriorism, despite a different version of a concept of a priori cognition” (Gornshtein, 
1969, 215). In the section Hartmann devoted to time, Gornshtein also distinguish-
es the real time, the ideal time and the time of intuition. Hartmann’s understand-
ing of the essence of the ‘now’ moment is crucially important to her. Interestingly, 
she compares, albeit briefly, Hartmann’s ideas of time to the ideas of the same mat-
ter which belonged to such English-speaking philosophers as G. Witrow, B. Russell, 
A. Whitehead. Hereafter, she addresses Hartmann’s appraisal of the relativity theory. 
The quintessence of the section on cosmological categories is represented by Gorn-
shtein’s analysis of Hartmann’s concept of causality, with particular attention paid 
to Hartmann’s critique of positivism identifying “laws governing phenomena with 
causality”, and with comparison made between his ideas of causality and those of 
J. P. Sartre. She also refers to some research made by some prominent Soviet philos-
ophers on the problem of causality. However, Gornshtein argues that, “the struggle 
with teleology is a progressive point of Hartmann’s natural philosophy…” (Gorn-
shtein, 1969, 255), yet “…Hartmann, defending the principle of determinism, does 
not go beyond the mechanistic one-line understanding of causality in the physical 
world, denies objective contingency” (Gornshtein, 1969, 255). Interestingly, the last 
chapter contains a noteworthy analysis of the concept of a dynamic system and the 
relation between dynamical systems and the gradual character of nature. However, 
estimating Hartmann’s philosophy of nature, as a whole, Gornshtein believes that 
“Hartmann is intent on proving the limitation of scientific cognition as such” (Gorn-
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shtein, 1969, 266). She believes that his idea of natural philosophy was trapped by 
agnosticism.
Tatyana Gornshtein devotes the conclusion of the book to the summary of the 
key ideas. She insists on Hartmann’s philosophy being of the objective idealistic na-
ture, although, according to her, the doctrine advanced by him cannot be considered 
‘uniform’ in this regard, since some of the aspects of his doctrine can be identified 
as subjective-idealistic, positivistic and also materialistic (especially in regard to nat-
ural philosophy). However, she considers the insistence on the similarity between 
Hartmann’s philosophy and dialectical materialism ‘illusory’. Gornshtein goes into 
details and presents her critique of some arguments which justify the similarity of 
Hartmann’s ontology to dialectical materialism, showing, for instance, that Günter 
Jacobi’s philosophy, which owes a lot to Hartmann’s ontology, leads to theological con-
clusions. Moreover, according to her, in respect of methodology, “transformation of 
Hegel’s dialectic undertaken by Hartmann is much closer to Neo-Hegelianism than to 
Marxism” (Gornshtein, 1969, 270). Generally, Gornshtein believes that in criticizing 
positions of Neo-Kantianism and positivism, Hartmann still turns out to be depend-
ent on them. Therefore, according to her, eventually, “Hartmann’s eclectic philosophy 
is epigone” (Gornshtein, 1969, 273).
Concluding this presentation of Nicolai Hartmann’s Philosophy by Tatya-
na Gornshtein, I would like to point out that, despite its touch of tendentiousness, 
especially noticeable at some points, it still remains a highly competent presenta-
tion of the German philosopher’s ideas, demonstrating a surprisingly deep insight 
into his works, and it gives quite a noteworthy appraisal and critique of his ontol-
ogy from the standpoint of dialectical materialism. Therefore, it remains relevant 
for Hartmann studies. Needless to say, it was one of few rare sources, from which 
Soviet intellectuals could get information on Nicolai Hartmann’s ideas, and it still 
remains a most important document for studying both the history of the recep-
tion Hartmann’s philosophy in the Russian-speaking community and the history 
of Soviet philosophy in general. Perhaps, it is worth noting that Gornshtein’s work 
was employed in philosophical didactics not only for courses on history of modern 
philosophy, but also for systematic courses on general ontology at Saint Petersburg 
State University during the Perestroika era and also for at least one decade of post-So-
viet times in Russia. Finally, I would like to express my sincere hope that eventu-
ally, after all copyright issues will have been settled, Tatyana Gornshtein’s Nicolai 
Hartmann’s Philosophy will be translated into English (and, perhaps, into other for-
eign languages) and become a part of the common heritage of the world Hartmann 
studies.
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